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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BUSCH CORPORATION, dba BUSCH 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., and QUAIL-
BROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY 
COMPANY and ROYAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 19859 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff and appellant for liabil-
ity insurance coverage under policies issued by State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Company and Royal Insurance Company. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Dean E. Conder of the Third Judicial 
District Court granted defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Company's Motion to Dismiss and granted defendant Royal Insurance 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and respondent Royal Insurance Company seeks 
affirmance of the summary judgment entered in its favor by the 
lower court. 
•1-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant/respondent Royal Insurance Company issued a 
business comprehensive liability policy to the named insured 
Busch Development, Inc. for the period from February 15, 1978 to 
February 15, 1979. (Record p. 76) An endorsement to the policy 
added additional named insureds, including "Busch-Quailbrook, a 
Ltd. Partnership11 as a named insured. (Record p. 78) 
The written policy as issued contained a written 
"Conditions" section requiring full compliance with all terms of 
the policy as a condition precedent to suit against the company: 
4. Insuredfs Duties in the Event of 
Occurrence, Claim or Suit. 
(a) In the event of an occurrence, writ-
ten notice containing particulars suf-
ficient to identify the Insured and also 
reasonably obtainable information with 
respect to the time, place and circumstances 
thereof, and the names, and addresses of the 
injured and of available witnesses, shall 
be given by or for the Insured to the com-
pany or any of its authorized agents as 
soon as practicable. 
(b) If claim is made or suit is brought 
against the Insured, the Insured shall 
immediately forward to the company, every 
demand, notice, summons or other process 
received by him or his representative. 
(c) The Insured shall cooperate with the 
company and, upon the company's request, 
assist in making settlements in the conduct 
of suits and in enforcing any right of 
contribution or indemnity against any person 
or organization who may be liable to the 
Insured because of injury or damage with 
respect to which insurance is afforded 
under this policy; and the Insured shall 
attend hearings and trials and assist in 
securing and giving evidence and obtaining 
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the attendance of witnesses. The Insured 
shall not, except at his own cost, volun-
tarily make any payment, assume any obliga-
tion or incur any expense other than for 
first aid to others at the time of 
accident. 
5. Action Against Company. 
(a) No action shall lie against the 
company unless, as a condition precedent 
thereto, there shall have been full 
compliance with all of the terms of this 
policy, nor until the amount of the 
Insured's obligation to pay shall have been 
finally determined either by judgment 
against the Insured after actual trial or 
by written agreement of the Insured, the 
claimant and the company. [Emphasis added] 
In September, 1980, Busch Development, Inc. and Busch 
Corporation were sued in an action entitled Earl Phillip Morgan, 
et al., v. Busch Development, Inc., a corporation, and Busch 
Corp., a corporation, Civil No. C-80-6884 in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County (hereinafter, the "prior 
lawsuit11) (Record p. 22). Plaintiffs alleged that defendants 
constructed a subdivision known as "Quailbrook East" in 1978, and 
designed and constructed the subdivision to allow surface water 
to discharge improperly onto the property of Ilr. Morgan, et al. 
Defendants hired counsel who undertook their defense. Defense 
counsel moved to dismiss plaintiffs1 complaint on grounds that 
neither Busch Development, Inc. nor Busch Corporation owned any 
interest in Quailbrook East or constructed any improvements on 
that project. On stipulation, an entity entitled Quailbrook 
Condominium Company was substituted as defendant. The case pro-
ceeded through discovery and to trial, and plaintiffs were 
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awarded judgment against Quailbrook Condominium Company for 
$29,000 plus costs, on Hay 19, 1982. In July, 1982, Quailbrook 
Condominium Company filed its appeal from the adverse judgment, 
which is currently pending before this court, No. 18623. 
Royal Insurance Companyfs first notice of any of these 
matters was by letter dated February 1, 1983, from a represen-
tative of Busch Development, Inc. (Affidavit of Dennis Foster, p. 
2). 
This notice came five years after the alleged occurrence 
began; over two years after the prior lawsuit was filed; and over 
six months after the district court entered judgment and appeal 
was commenced. It is undisputed on the record that prior to 
February 1, 1983, Royal Insurance had no opportunity to investi-
gate the circumstances surrounding the claims in the prior 
lawsuit, nor to attempt to adjust or settle the prior lawsuit, 
nor to employ its own counsel to defend the action. Appellants 
have offered no excuse or explanation for their late notice. 
The instant action was filed in September, 1983, seeking 
indemnification for the judgment entered in the prior lawsuit and 
for attorney's fees expended in defending and appealing that 
action. 
Royal Insurance Company filed its motion for summary 
judgment under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, supported 
by the affidavit of Dennis Foster, its Salt Lake claims manager, 
setting forth the material facts as stated above. Plaintiffs 
filed no affidavit or other form of sworn testimony in opposition 
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to the motion. The court, Honorable Dean E. Conder, entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of Royal Insurance on Itarch 8, 1984 
(Record pp. 107-108). 
ARGUMENT 
The district court was correct in granting the motion 
for summary judgment based on the record before it, for the 
reasons that (1) no notice was given of the alleged occurrence or 
the prior lawsuit at any material time; and (2) Quailbrook 
Condominium Company was not a named insured under the policy. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
The summary judgment sought shall be ren-
dered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
This court in Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 
624 (1960), stated: 
[Wjhere the moving party's evidentiary 
material is in itself sufficient and the 
opposing party fails to proffer any evi-
dentiary matter when he is presumably in a 
position to do so, the courts should be 
justified in concluding that no genuine 
issue of fact is present, nor would one be 
present at trial. J[d. at 269, 351 P.2d at 
637. 
Under this rule, the district court's decision to grant 
Royal's motion for summary judgment was correct. This respondent 
presented uncontradicted evidence that appellant gave no timely 
notice to it of the alleged damage to the property adjoining its 
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development or of the lawsuit arising out of that damage. 
Appellant proffered no excuse for its delay in giving notice. 
Furthermore, respondent introduced uncontroverted evidence that 
the entity Quailbrook Condominium Company was not a named insured 
under its policy, and that Busch Corporation, defendant in the 
prior action, was substituted out of that lawsuit and is not 
liable for the judgment entered therein. 
The trial court was correct in holding that on the 
undisputed material facts, reasonable minds could not differ that 
appellant breached the terms of its insurance contract with 
respondent and that Quailbrook Condominium Company has no right 
to indemnification under that contract. 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S BREACH OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE 
INSURANCE CONTRACT RELIEVED ROYAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY FROM ITS OBLIGATION UNDER THE 
CONTRACT. 
Although there is no Utah decision directly on point, 
the most persuasive authorities from neighboring jurisdictions, 
as well as the best reasoned commentaries on the subject, are 
persuasive that under the facts of this case, appellant breached 
the insurance contract as a matter of law and respondent is not 
obliged to show actual prejudice to it as a result. 
This position has been adopted by the leading cases in 
the jurisdictions of Idaho, Washington, Nevada, Oregon and 
Colorado. 
Viani v. Aetna Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 22, 501 P.2d 706 
(1972), was cited by appellant in its opening brief for the 
analysis of various approaches to the general topic of possible 
defenses by an insurance carrier based on failure of cooperation 
or notice by the insured. However, appellant fails to point out 
that the express holding of the Idaho Supreme Court in the Viani 
case was that the question of prejudice to the insurer was imma-
terial where the insured failed to perform the condition prece-
dent of giving notice of the suit and forwarding summons and 
complaint within a reasonable time. 
In that case, the insured failed to give notice of his 
potential liability or notice of the lawsuit filed against him 
until after final judgment was entered against him. The insured 
offered no excuse for the late notice. The Idaho Supreme Court 
noted substantial authority in other jurisdictions for its posi-
tion. Ld. at 713, note 5. 
The court recognized certain legitimate business 
interests of the insurance carrier which are protected by this 
rule: The carrier is entitled to some degree of control over the 
litigation, or where there are multiple insurers, to refuse to 
accept defense of the action. It is entitled to independently 
review settlement offers or make its own settlement offers. It 
is entitled to see that crucial issues which could affect its 
eventual liability are tried and all relevant matters examined. 
The court observed that this rule is not unduly harsh. 
The insured still has the opportunity to offer an excuse for its 
noncompliance or to prove that it substantially performed 
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according to the notice requirement. On the other hand, this 
rule recognizes the legitimate rights of insurers. 
The Idaho court also based its decision on a statute 
governing insurance contract interpretation and construction 
identical to Utah's statute. The Idaho Code §41-1822 requirement 
that "every insurance contract shall be construed according to 
the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the 
policy . . ." aided the court in finding that a clear interpre-
tation of the policy at issue would require notice as required by 
the policy. Utah Code §31-19-36 contains identical language, and 
compels the same result in the instant case. As the Idaho 
Supreme Court observed, this rule "not only recognizes the legi-
timate business interests of insurers but also recognizes and 
gives effect to, the express provisions of the insurance contract 
which we are admonished to do by statute.11 501 P.2d at 714 
[emphasis added]. 
Washington has adopted this same approach. In Sears, 
Roebuck & Company v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 313 P.2d 
347 (Wash. 1957), the insured waited 14 months to forward notice 
of a claim against it to its insurer. Notice arrived one week 
before trial. In a subsequent action against the insurer for 
indemnification, the Washington Supreme Court held that depriving 
an insurer of the right to protect itself against liability in a 
prior suit against its insured automatically constituted preju-
dice. The court stated: 
To be deprived of that right constitutes 
prejudice, however imponderable the damages, 
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and however efficient and competent 
the attorneys retained by the insured . . . 
Our view is that in this case it was 
immaterial whether Hartford was prejudiced 
or not. Ld. at 353. 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. v. Cassinelli, 216 
P.2d 606 (Nev. 1950), the insurance policy contained notice 
requirements identical to those in the Royal policy. The 
insured was involved in an accident on November 23, 1945. A 
complaint was served on the insured on September 19, 1946. Four 
months later and 35 days before trial, the insured notified its 
insurer. The Supreme Court of Nevada held: 
[W]e find the authorities overwhelmingly in 
favor of giving full recognition to such 
[notice] provision, in which case the pre-
sence or absence of prejudice resulting 
from a delay in giving notice becomes 
immaterial. I_d. at 615. 
The Nevada Supreme Court held that a four-month delay in 
giving notice was, under the circumstances, unreasonable. The 
court found that a change in this long-standing rule should be 
made by the legislature, if at all. The court observed that a 
decision that would inevitably lead to an increase in insurance 
risks and to a necessity for higher rates was one that should be 
deferred to the state legislature. Ld. at 616. 
In Bonney v. Jones, 439 P.2d 881 (Ore. 1968), the 
insured mistakenly believed that no claim would be filed against 
him because the person he injured was covered under Workmen's 
Compensation. When a third-party claim was filed against the 
insured on the eve of the running of the statute of limitations, 
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he notified his insurer. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the 
insurer was not liable, without requiring a showing of prejudice. 
The court stated: 
We have also indicated by way of dictum 
that the insurer is not required to prove 
that it has been prejudiced by the failure 
to give notice in such cases. I_d. at 882. 
In Wetzbarger v. Eisen, 475 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1970), an 
insured gave no notice to his insurer that suit had been filed 
against him until a year after the papers were served. Even 
though the insurer had received notice of the accident, the court 
held that late notice of the suit rendered the insurance policy 
null and void and that the insurer had no burden of proving pre-
judice as a result of the delay: 
[A] policy of insurance is a contract and 
failure to give proper notice is a breach 
of a condition precedent which relieves the 
insurer of any liability under the policy. 
Id. at 640. 
In the instant case, Royal Insurance received no notice 
of the alleged occurrence giving rise to liability, had no oppor-
tunity to investigate the events, was denied an opportunity to 
participate in the prior lawsuit, and learned of the claim 
against its insured only after the prior action was tried to a 
judgment and appealed. Appellant itself has breached a condition 
precedent of its contract with Royal. Breach of a material term 
of an insurance policy by an insured and the resulting denial of 
the insurerfs rights under the policy to the extent shown by the 
facts in this case, clearly demonstrate that appellant should be 
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denied recovery on the insurance contract as a matter of law. 
Although there are no Utah cases on point, the above 
rule is supported by consistent reasoning in a case decided under 
a rule distinguished by the Utah Supreme Court from situations 
similar to the instant case. In Broadbent v. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 25 Utah 2d 430, 483 P.2d 894 (1971), a 
physician believed that he may have treated his patient with too 
much radiation, but gave no notice to his insurer of the inci-
dent. Ten years later, the patient filed suit against the doc-
tor. The insurer sought to avoid coverage on grounds that it did 
not receive timely notice of the earlier incident. Although the 
Utah Supreme Court found that the insurer was liable under the 
policy, it did so on grounds that because "the practice of medi-
cine is not an exact science11 the physician could not have been 
"aware of any alleged injury covered" over the course of the 
patient's treatment. On the other hand, the court noted that an 
insured should be required to give notice when "it should be 
obvious to him that he has caused harm . . . and that a claim is 
likely to be made against him." JLcl. at 433-434, 483 P.2d at 
895-896. The Broadbent opinion distinguished the fact situation 
in that case from cases relating to notice "after the occurrence 
of a specific event, such as the death of an insured, an injury 
to one's person, a loss by a fire or theft, or a collision be-
tween cars." Id., at 433, 483 P.2d at 896. 
The present case falls within the rule stated in the 
Broadbent opinion because it deals with a "specific event." If 
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the alleged damage to the property adjoining Quailbrook did not 
make it obvious to appellant that it had caused harm and that a 
claim was likely to be made against it, the prior lawsuit against 
appellant must have been the sort of identifiable event that the 
Broadbent court found would be reason to require notice. At 
the very least, the Broadbent decision means that a lawsuit 
against an insured constitutes a "specific event" that would 
require notice to the insurer under a policy that made notice a 
condition precedent to indemnification. Failure to give that 
notice constitutes breach of the terms of the policy. 
Although the Broadbent opinion did not discuss specifi-
cally whether a showing of prejudice would be necessary to avoid 
liability in cases of late notice of a "specific event," it cited 
as authority Sohm v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 352 F.2d 65 
(6th Cir. 1965). The Sohm case held that failure to supply writ-
ten notice "as soon as practicable" was a simple breach of the 
policy provisions and absolved the insurer of any liability. In 
so holding, the Sohm court found that prejudice to the insurer 
was irrelevant, stating: 
The inquiry into whether the appellee was 
prejudiced by the delay is irrelevant for 
if the giving of notice was a condition 
precedent to the right of recovery, [the 
insured's] failure to give it prevented any 
liability from attaching. I_d. at 69. 
The policy behind strict enforcement of notice provi-
sions is sound. Encouraging prompt notice gives the insurer an 
opportunity to make a timely and adequate investigation of all the 
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circumstances, prevents collusion between the insured and the per-
son claiming damages, promotes judicial economy, counters the ill 
effects of witnesses1 lapse of memory, and promotes early compro-
mise and settlement. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice §4731 
(1981). Defending actions without the expertise and resources 
available to an insurer can lead to higher liability and harm to 
the general public through higher premiums. The court in Boston 
Ins. Co. v. Ilalone, 269 F.Supp. 19 (N.D.Tex. 1966), aff'd 378 
F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1967), observed: 
A public liability insurance company could 
hardly exist on reasonable premiums if its 
opportunity to investigate and settle 
possible claims in the early stages was 
dependent upon the biased judgment of their 
insureds on questions of that nature. Id. 
at 21 . 
Furthermore, requiring an insurer to show prejudice as a 
result of late notice means requiring it to prove that a witness 
may have remembered something he no longer remembers or that a 
piece of evidence that once existed has since disappeared. The 
extreme weight of this burden is obvious: 
What the insurer would have discovered had 
it been given timely notice, and been able 
to conduct a prompt investigation or had it 
been given cooperation is problematical; it 
will generally have no more information at 
the time of the proceeding brought against 
it under the policy than it had at the time 
of the tort action. Thus, any evaluation by 
court or jury as to the prejudicial effect 
of the non-compliance must be entirely con-
jectural. Similar imponderables arise when 
the assured fails to notify the insurer of 
an impending court action. . . . 68 Harv. 
L.Rev. 260 (1970). 
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The inequity of subjecting Royal to such a burden as a 
result of the appellant's breach of the notice provision of the 
insurance contract is readily apparent. 
The district court was correct in granting Royal's 
motion for summary judgment without requiring a showing of preju-
dice to Royal as a result of appellant's late notice under the 
facts of this case. Where the insured gives notice of potential 
liability under a policy five years after the event giving rise 
to that liability, and two years after service of process in the 
lawsuit concerning that liability, and after an unfavorable 
judgment, where there is nothing on the record to suggest any 
excuse or justification, the insured has breached the conditions 
of that policy and the insurer is not liable under the terms of 
the insurance contract. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT OF INDEMNIFICATION 
FROM DEFENDANT ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY. 
In the prior action, the record is clear that 
"Quailbrook Condominium Company11 was the entity substituted as 
the defendant in that lawsuit. The named insured in the Royal 
policy was Busch Development, Inc. "Busch-Quailbrook, a Ltd. 
Partnership11 is one of several additional named insureds whose 
name comes closest to that of "Quailbrook Condominium Company," 
the entity against which judgment has been taken. It is 
undisputed that "Quailbrook Condominium Company" does not appear 
as an insured or additional insured on the written policy. Based 
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on the undisputed record before it, the trial court properly 
ruled that the prior judgment against Quailbrook Condominium 
Company should not bind Royal Insurance on its coverage issued to 
Busch-Quailbrook, a limited partnership. 
The interpretation of an unambiguous written contract is 
a question of law to be decided by the judge. Morris v. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, the summary judgment entered by the 
district court is supported by the undisputed facts on the 
record that Quailbrook Condominium Company is not a named insured 
under the Royal policy. Appellant introduced no evidence before 
the trial court to indicate that Royal had a duty to indemnify 
Quailbrook Condominium Company, and as a matter of law, Royal had 
no duty to assume the liability of an entity which there is no 
evidence it ever undertook to insure. 
CONCLUSION 
Where on defendant's motion for summary judgment, the 
district court had before it the undisputed material facts of 
plaintiff's breach of the conditions for notice of claim and 
notice of suit in the written insurance contract, as well as the 
undisputed record that Quailbrook Condominium Company, defendant 
in the prior action, was not a party to the insuring agreement, 
and where plaintiffs offered nothing on the record for excuse or 
justification, the summary judgment in favor of defendant Royal 
Insurance should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted this /Q day of July, 1984. 
STRONG y^mm^7 
By //\M//\ IMAL 
'Roger H^ —frailock 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent Royal Insurance Company 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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